This paper considers the vertical implications of horizontal diversification. Many studies have documented organizational problems following corporate diversification. We propose that selective vertical disintegration -shifting asset ownership to agents -can mitigate rent-seeking and coordination failures in the diversified firm. We test this proposition in a particularly simple setting that allows us to isolate the effects of interest and control for the likely endogeneity of diversification: taxi fleets that diversify into the limousine, or black car, segment following a wave of entry deregulation in the early 1990s. The results show that taxi fleets are substantially more likely to use owner-operator drivers following diversification. Moreover, diversified fleets that use a greater share of owner operators are more productive than diversified fleets that own most of their vehicles. We interpret these findings as evidence that firms re-organize in response to the challenges of diversification, and that there are causal links between the horizontal and vertical boundaries of the fleet.
Introduction
What determines the boundaries of the firm? Since Coase (1937) , this fundamental question has captured the attention of firm scholars. In the last several decades, the transaction-cost literature that has made considerable progress addressing Coase's question by analyzing vertical boundaries as a series of independent transaction-level decisions (see Masten and Saussier 2002, and Macher and Richman 2007 for re-from high-end restaurants to stadiums and nursing homes. On the internet, eBay offers a vertically specialized service that spans an astonishing number of markets.
By emphasizing the interplay between horizontal and vertical integration, this paper contributes to a stream of research that provides empirical evidence of externalities across transactions within a firm.
3 For example, Kalnins and Lafontaine (2004) and Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) show that the balance between independent and company-owned outlets in a franchise systems responds to both geographic spillovers and advertising intensity (which produces a free-rider problem). Novak and Stern (2007) show that make-or-buy decisions are highly correlated across sub-systems within a given automobile, and attribute this finding to complementarities in design and production. Similarly, Forbes and Lederman (2007) find that major airlines are less likely to contract with independent regional carriers on routes serving hub airports, where schedule disruptions may have system-wide implications.
This paper also adds to a nascent strategic management literature that considers organizational change in response to diversification. 4 For example, Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell (1998) examine the reallocation of resources between targets and acquiring firms in a sample of 253 horizontal acquisitions. Karim and Mitchell (2000) study the relationship between acquisitions and product-line changes in a large sample of medical firms. Rothermael, Hitt and Jobe (2006) examine the use of taper integration -a combination of vertical integration and strategic outsourcing -in the microcomputer industry. A key contribution of our paper is the empirical strategy: since a variety of (unobserved) industry and firm-level factors 3 Most of the papers in this literature are motivated by theoretical work in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985) or property rights and incomplete contracting (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990) . As a critique of early theoretical work, the idea of intra-firm externalities dates back at least to Harrigan (1984) , and can also be found in the work of Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) . Segal (1999) provides the foundations for a formal analysis of contracting with externalities. 4 The theoretical literature on diversification is voluminous. Hypothesized benefits include fixed-cost sharing (Panzar and Willig 1981) and the ability to leverage firm-specific capabilities across multiple lines of business (Teece 1980; Levinthal and Wu 2006) . Potential costs of diversification include a range of managerial and operational disturbances, capital budgeting problems, and distortions caused by intra-firm rent seeking at the division level (Lang and Stulz 1994; Lamont, 1997; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000; Schoar 2002; Rawley 2007) . might influence both diversification and organizational change, we rely on instrumental variables to identify the parameters of the underlying organizational production function. 5
Theoretical development
Our central proposition is that firms adjust their internal organization to reduce rent-seeking behavior and improve coordination between business units following diversification. Specifically, we consider a case where horizontal diversification, motivated by operational synergies, can lead to changes in asset ownership in order to mitigate intra-firm conflicts. Since asset ownership is commonly used as a measure of vertical integration, this simple theory links changes in the vertical and horizontal boundaries of the firm.
Diversification is often motivated by the potential for two formally independent business units to achieve synergies, or economies of scope, by operating under unified corporate management. Typically, the expectation of achieving synergies is based on the idea that some key slack asset -production equipment, technology infrastructure, a sales force or a talented manager -can be utilized more intensively when shared, thus lowering the average cost of production. Of course, this requires that internal coordination outperform market exchange (Teece 1982) , which in turn depends on the cooperation of those who utilize or control access to the key assets.
The economic literature on vertical integration identifies two distinct forms of cooperation: ex ante investments that increase productivity and ex post negotiation over the resulting surplus. Different theories of the firm develop specific explanations why formal organization may outperform the market in either of these dimensions (Gibbons 2005) . However, a common thread is that neither firms nor markets will produce optimal investment levels, or realize all potential gains from trade, in the absence of complete contracts and costless bargaining. Thus, we focus on the case where significant conflicts over access to a key asset are likely to arise, and neither selective intervention (Williamson, 1985) nor simple contracts can induce efficient cooperation.
Make-or-buy theories of the firm are typically motivated by vertical issues, such as conflicts between a manufacturer and distributor, particularly when the parties make transaction-specific investments. One contribution of our paper is to point out that similar problems can arise within firms between horizontallyrelated business units. Indeed, the logic of scope economies make it likely that conflicts will arise over access to common resources. Areas of potential conflict include access to customers (channel conflict), territorial rights (as in franchising), the capital budgeting process and promotions. Since these divisional conflicts typically lead to rent-seeking behavior and possibly resource mis-allocation (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000), we expect diversified firms to organize in ways that limit the damage from conflicts.
Corporate managers have a variety of organizational tools for addressing this problem including monitoring, incentive contracts, job design, and recruiting policies. We focus on the idea that vertical boundaries can be used to address horizontal conflicts. In particular, firms may pursue a policy of selective vertical dis-integration -retaining assets that are shared across business lines, but transferring control over segment-specific resources to the division -to limit rent-seeking and promote efficient ex ante investments. 6 This idea builds on Grossman and Hart's (1986) insight that asset ownership conveys property rights, and these can alter incentives by shifting the bargaining power among parties to a given transaction.
An example may help to illustrate our hypothesis. Consider a multi-divisional firm that generates opportunities at the corporate level and fulfills them within divisions. If the divisions are substitutable, and the corporate parent cannot pre-commit to a mechanism for allocating opportunities, division managers will spend much of their time lobbying the parent. 7 In a model without horizontal externalities, Grossman and Hart (1986) suggest that firms will dis-integrate because the division under-invests in (noncontractible) production capabilities when the parent captures a large share of the joint surplus. In this 6 We are being intentionally broad about the boundaries of the firm here. For example, a firm might undertake disintegration contractually by giving its employees (divisions) more discretion and stronger incentives, or it could terminate employment (ownership) and use them as a contractor. 7 We assume the division managers' rewards somehow depend on sales, which are clearly outside their control in this very simple example.
setting, there is an added benefit: the dis-integrated division has weaker lobbying incentives. Note, however, that an independent division may still contract with the parent, especially if the internal division may be capacity constrained. 8 Thus, the dis-integrated firm provides swing capacity with limited coordination costs, but no guarantee of service. This may be more efficient than a fully integrated firm so long as the fixed costs of dis-integration (for example, setting up an independent sales capability) are not too high. The specific conditions (i) through (iii) in Hypothesis 1 delimit our claims: we do not believe diversification will lead to dis-integration always and everywhere. However, we do think this argument generalizes beyond the taxi industry. Moreover, if Hypothesis 1 is valid, then vertical dis-integration facilitates a shift away from transactional mis-alignment, which may arise as firms and industries change, and we would expect this to have performance consequences (Nickerson and Silverman, 2003) . This argument leads immediately to a second hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2. Under the conditions specified in Hypothesis 1, firms that remain vertically inte-
grated following diversification will be less productive than firms that shift to the efficient organizational structure.
To be clear, Hypothesis 2 is the mechanism behind Hypothesis 1: we assume that firms' choose their organizational form with productive efficiency (and ultimately profits) in mind. 9 However, separating the two propositions highlights an important empirical consideration. We test the first hypothesis by exploit- Since we do not have a proper instrument, such as a source of random variation in firms' adjustment costs, we interpret our tests of Hypothesis 2 with some caution.
Industry and Institutional Background
We use data from the private for-hire vehicle industry -taxi and limousine fleets -to test our hypotheses.
This industry is particularly well-suited to the study of diversification and adaptation since firms rely on a simple production technology, operate in diverse local markets and exhibit substantial variation in contracting practices, horizontal diversification and vertical integration. This section describes the industry in greater detail, focusing on the legal factors that led to a wave of horizontal diversification between 1992
and 1997, and the economic factors that influence the decision to diversify into limos and/or contract with owner-operators who drive their own vehicles.
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Our measure of horizontal diversification is based on whether a fleet operates both taxicabs and limos.
The primary difference between these two segments is that taxicabs can legally accept a hail (i.e., any passenger who solicits a ride), while all limo rides must be pre-arranged, usually through a centralized dispatcher. The number of taxi cab licenses granted in a given market is fixed by a local taxi commission, which provides medallions or permits that are associated with a specific vehicle and regularly inspected.
Entry into the limo segment is considerably more flexible. While some cities or states certify each limo franchise, restrictions on the number of vehicles in use are rare.
The exclusion of black cars from the hail segment leads to some important differences in the organiza- There are three basic types of contract used in the taxi segment. The first is a shift driver who leases the car, permit and dispatching service from a fleet on a day-to-day basis. In 1990, fifty-one percent of the vehicles in US fleets were staffed via these day or half-day leases (TLPA 1990 Ta- ble 1), and a larger (but unknown) percentage of all taxicabs in the market. Note that vehicle ownership does little to change a taxi-driver's short-term incentive to locate rides-since both fleet-drivers and owner-operators are typically full residual claimants-but may solve moral hazard problems or promote longterm investments to acquire industry-specific knowledge.
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In fact, the level of fleet-ownership in the taxi segment is at first puzzling, given the obvious moralhazard problems created by this arrangement (Schneider 2005) . However, many shift drivers are recent immigrants with very few marketable skills, who would find it difficult to finance a car and medallionwhich can cost over $300,000 (Luo 2004) . Our discussions with a number of fleet managers suggested that attracting the appropriate labor force is a key challenge in this industry and can present difficult trade-offs. In particular, the leasing system allows fleets to tap a large low-skilled labor pool, but managing shift drivers, who are only weakly committed to their job, is a major challenge. These drivers were often characterized as having limited knowledge of the city, poor language skills, little patience for spe- portantly, give the impression that they take pride in getting their passengers from point A to point B safely. Moreover, our interviews suggest that while shift drivers tend to rely on a combination of dispatch and serendipity to generate rides, owner-operators will invest in industry-specific knowledge, often developing their own relationships with repeat customers and a better sense of where the hails are likely to be at any point in time.
Before the early 1990s, the taxi and limo segments were kept separate through regulation. This situation changed in the early 1990s, following a series of legal challenges to local regulatory authority. One of the most famous examples was the 1993 "Freedom Cab" case (Jones v. Temmer) in Denver, which garnered national publicity over a small firm's challenge to the broad regulatory authority Colorado exercised over entry into the taxi market (Cox, 1993) . Within four years of the Freedom Cab case, entry into the limo segment was effectively deregulated in all fifty states. The practical result of these changes was to remove any legal or political obstacles to cross-ownership, and it led to a wave of horizontal diversification. In our data, 54% of the taxi fleets that survived from 1992 to 1997 diversified into limos during that period (see Table 1 ).
The logic behind horizontal diversification into the limo segment is predicated on fixed cost sharing and improved vehicle utilization. While opportunities for cost sharing extend to a wide range of activities, from servicing vehicles to negotiating group rates for insurance, shared marketing and dispatch operations present the greatest opportunity. However, shared dispatching also creates significant challenges.
Whereas taxi-only firms dispatch vehicles based solely on proximity to the call, integrated taxi and limousine firms dispatch limousines to the highest value rides, in part because the firm captures a share of the receipts from limo rides. As long as taxi drivers pay a flat fee for leasing and dispatching, which gives them strong incentives to find the hails, the fleet will have an incentive to utilize all available limo capaci-
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Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MSty before providing any dispatch service to the cabs. Our discussions with fleet operators suggest that conflicts over shared dispatching present serious challenges for the firm. In some cases, taxi drivers scoop limo dispatches by arriving in advance of the limousine and giving customers the mistaken impression that their limo had been cancelled. At a minimum, integration creates confusion among shift drivers over contract terms (taxi drivers in diversified firms pay lower lease prices because they receive fewer and less attractive dispatches, but this is often not well understood by the shift drivers), engenders ill will between taxi and limousine drivers and lowers the price that a taxi driver is willing to pay for dispatch.
In addition to conflicts over access to shared dispatch, diversification creates a set of issues related to marketing incentives and demand sharing. In a diversified fleet, deploying taxicabs on limo calls can mitigate peak-load problems in the limo segment. However, in order to maintain the limo fleet's brand position this swing capacity must be a set of clean, well-maintained taxicabs operated by knowledgeable, polite drivers.
Thus, integrated fleets face the conditions described in Hypothesis 1. First, there are a broad set of operational synergies that lead to joint production of taxi and limo rides, but also create conflicts over the access to shared dispatch. Second, driver asset-ownership helps to mitigate this problem by creating incentives for drivers to invest in industry-specific knowledge that facilitates more efficient substitution of dispatching effort for driver search. Finally, the fact that most markets contain a mix of owner operators and fleet-owned vehicles suggests that the fixed costs of dis-integration are relatively small. Thus, Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive correlation between lateral diversification into limos and vertical disintegration in the taxi segment.
Our discussion with operators suggests that this theory is broadly consistent with anecdotal evidence discussed in the industry. Diversified fleets seemed to have a strong preference for owner-operators as a form of swing capacity. There was also less conflict between these drivers and the limo operators, since they shared a level of professionalism. Owner operators more readily understood the quid pro quo inhe-
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MSrent in their contract with a diversified taxi firm. And owner-operators' investments, in learning to drive a city and finding their own repeat business, made them less reliant on the dispatcher than the shift drivers.
Our empirical tests examine whether taxi fleets that diversified into limos between 1992 and 1997 became more vertically dis-integrated (i.e. shifted towards owner-operators) relative to non-diversifying fleets. We address the endogeneity of the diversification decision by developing a market-level instrumental variable based on conditions in the local limo market (as of 1992). But first, we pause to consider a question raised by our measure of vertical integration: If a fleet contracts to provide dispatching services to a formerly independent owner-operator, does that represent vertical dis-integration?
A substantial amount of the vertical dis-integration in our data comes from the arrival of owneroperators, who contract with taxi fleets for dispatching service. This is not particularly surprising, since increased competition in the limo market following deregulation drives owner-operators to contract with fleets in two different ways. First, independent taxi-operators face the direct effect of limousine competition in the pre-arranged ride market, an important component of their block of business. Second, as passengers substitute limos for taxis in the pre-arranged market, more of the (fixed) taxi supply will shifts to the hail market, increasing competition in an area where owner-operators' superior knowledge traditionally provided an edge over shift drivers.
While this suggests that owner operators will increasingly shift towards fleet affiliation -a trend that is readily observed in Table 1 -our theory makes a specific prediction about which fleets these owneroperators will seek to join: fleets that have diversified into the limo segment. The match between an owner operator and a diversified fleet creates more value because the fleet values the owner operator's professionalism and the driver values the dispatcher's efforts to find high quality rides.
This discussion of owner-operators and integration suggests a re-interpretation of our hypotheses in terms of the different firm-level capabilities that exist in even this relatively un-differentiated product market. In particular, fleets that are vertically-integrated and horizontally-specialized compete by minimizing capital investment in vehicles and managing a pool of low-skill drivers, while horizontally-diversified and vertically dis-integrated fleets compete by establishing a brand that attracts the high quality rides valued by independent limo and taxi drivers. Of course, as an empirical matter, we still want to identify the impact of diversification on a fleet's vertical contracting decisions, holding constant the driver's choice of whether to contract with a firm or remain independent.
Data and Measurement
We use data from the 1992 and 1997 Economic Census of Transportation and Warehousing, which includes every taxi (SIC 412100) and limousine (SIC 411920) firm in the United States with at least one employee. These data contain establishment-level information on firm revenue, line of business revenue at the six-digit industry level, number of vehicles by type (taxi vs. limousine) and geographic identifiers.
We focus on taxi firms ("fleets") with at least two taxicabs, $10,000 of taxi revenue and at least one other taxi fleet in their market (county). The 1992 and 1997 Economic Censuses contain 1,020 and 1,106 fleets, respectively, that meet these criteria. 13 Alternative samples, based on more or less stringent restrictions, led to qualitatively similar results. Our panel regressions are based on a set of 560 fleets that reported complete data in both years. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these fleets, which account for over 70 percent of industry revenue and approximately two-thirds of all vehicles.
As can be seen in Table 1 , there were no diversified fleets in 1992. By 1997, 54 percent of the taxi fleets in our sample had entered the limo market. Average taxi-segment revenues increased from $675,000 to $849,000 between 1992 and 1997, while taxi-segment capital increased from $230,000 to $319,000. 14 Table 1 also shows a dramatic increase in the total number of taxis in our sample. This increase reflects the large number of formerly independent owner-operators who decided to contract with taxi fleets during this time period. These independent drivers are only captured by the Economic Census when they contract with a fleet.
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We measure diversification using an indicator variable DIVERSIFY that equals one for fleets in SIC code 412100 with no limousines in 1992, and one or more limos in their fleet by 1997. Alternative measures, such as a threshold for the percentage of total revenue or capital in the limo segment, were highly correlated with the single limousine measure of diversification, yielding very similar results.
Our primary dependent variable FLEETOWN is the share of all taxis owned by the fleet. Table 1 shows that the mean fleet ownership rate fell from 86 percent in 1992 to 63 percent in 1997. Figure 1 foreshadows our main results by showing that there is a strong correlation between DIVERSIFY and changes in FLEETOWN. Moreover, this correlation does not appear to be driven by heterogeneity in fleet size, which might be the case if both diversification and increased use of owner operators were correlated with unobserved productivity shocks.
Finally, we measure fleet-level productivity using production-function residuals, following the methodology described in . Specifically, we regress the log of taxisegment revenues on the number of vehicles and a full set of market-year fixed-effects, and use the estimated residuals (TFPQ) as a fleet-specific productivity measure. This method allows us to use information from the full sample of fleets to estimate productivity, even though we use a balanced panel to test Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the fixed effects in our productivity model should pick up any variation in pricing, since fare schedules are fixed at the market-year level. Thus, TFPQ is a measure of physical productivity or asset utilization, unlike most productivity studies where the dependent variable (firm revenue) is contaminated by the impact of unobserved market power on prices. (Additional details on production function estimation are provided in the Appendix.)
Methods
We test Hypothesis 1 using a simple OLS regression in first differences. Let i index the fleets in our sample and Δ represent the first-difference operator (between 1992 and 1997 (1)
where the parameter α measures the sample average change in FLEETOWN, and ε is the unexplained portion of any changes in vertical integration. Since we only observe two time-periods, taking firstdifferences is equivalent to introducing firm fixed-effects as either approach controls for unobserved time-invariant fleet-level factors that might influence FLEETOWN.
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While (1) controls for any correlation between diversification and time-invariant fleet-level unobservables that affect vertical integration, we might still worry about selection based on time-varying factors.
In an experimental design, we would randomly assign diversification status and measure ex post differences in fleet asset-ownership across the treatment and control groups. In practice, we observe changes in both diversification and asset ownership following a regulatory shift that creates new opportunities for expansion into related markets. In this setting, we might expect diversifiers to be those fleets who will benefit most from expanding, which could confound our estimates. For example, if fleets that experience a positive productivity shock expand through both diversification into limos and increased contracting with owner operators, the coefficient estimate on ΔDIVERSIFY will be biased.
We address the potential endogeneity of diversification by using the lagged concentration of limousines in a given market (LIMOHHI92) as an instrument for DIVERSIFY. In particular, we assume that LI-MOHHI92 is uncorrelated with factors in ε that influence taxi fleets' vertical integration decisions, and negatively correlated with the probability of diversification following deregulation. Why does limo con- 16 We also ran models with a full set of legal form of organization dummies (indicators for corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, co-operative) and obtained similar results. 17 Two additional advantages of this estimator relative to the more common within estimator are that there is no need to adjust the standard robust errors, and it provides some additional flexibility in how we specify X i . For example, we control for lagged size rather than size changes, which might be endogenous. Our instrumental variables identification strategy would not be valid if ex ante limo concentration were correlated with factors that influence vertical integration of taxi fleets in local markets. However, the cross-sectional correlation between FLEETOWN and LIMOHHI92 was not significant (raw correlation of 0.04) and our informal discussions suggest that the primary driver of limo entry was access to a base of corporate customers. 19 Another potential drawback of our instrumental variable is that it only generates market-level variation -we could not identify any fleet-level shifters of the costs or benefits of diversification that would satisfy the exclusion restriction for an instrument. In practice, we find that our IV generates substantial between-fleet variation, since the 560 fleets in our balanced panel operate in hundreds of different local markets.
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To complement our instrumental variables analysis, we use propensity score methods (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Imbens 2004) to control for correlations between X and DIVERSIFY. This approach is similar to the two-step selection correction originally proposed by Heckman (1979) , but makes fewer functional form assumptions in the first stage. We begin by estimating propensity scores Pr(DIVERSIFY i = 1|
X i ) using a probit model. These scores are then used as inverse probability weights in an OLS regression of equation (1). We also exclude fleets that do not fall on the common support of the estimated propensity score distribution. Intuitively, this approach will outperform standard regression control methods when 18 Retaliation could be economic or physical. Celona, 2004a and 2004b reports explicit connections between organized crime and intimidation of limo drivers. 19 Another concern might be that the timing or nature of deregulation is correlated with both ex ante limo concentration and factors that influence FLEETOWN. However, our discussions with local regulators suggest that deregulation was often carried out at the state level with little concern for variation in local market conditions. 20 We also estimated (but do not report) an OLS model that allowed the intercept in equation (1) to vary across markets, so the effect of DIVERSIFY is identified by deviations from a market-level asset ownership trend. While this approach requires that we discard our IV, the results were qualitatively similar to those reported below (1) reports coefficients and column (2) reports marginal effects at the average value of each regressor.
Only firm size, population density and limousines per capita had a statistically significant effect on the diversification decision. The effect of firm size is large and negative, though imprecise, perhaps indicating that organizational shocks are more costly for larger firms. Firms located in lower density areas are also less likely to diversify, perhaps reflecting an increased demand for limo service in more urban markets. Limousines per capita had a significant negative effect on diversification, which is consistent with the rationale offered for our IV estimator. Columns (3) through (8) in Table 2 examine the sample means of X for diversifying and non-diversifying fleets in both the full and matched samples. While the percentage differences are typically small, they are statistically significant for several variables, and trimming the sample produces only a modest improvement. This suggests that using propensity score weights is appropriate, though we do not expect large changes in β given the modest explanatory power of our first stage results.
Finally, we test Hypothesis 2 by estimating first-differenced model for TFPQ that includes interactions between diversification and fleet asset ownership as well as a set of additional control variables. Specifically, we estimate the following regression
where TOTALCARS i is the logged count of taxis in fleet i, FLEETCARS i is the logged count of taxis owned by the fleet, and X i is a vector of fleet characteristics that includes all of the variables described above along with a main effect for both TOTALCARS and FLEETCARS. In (2) the parameters β 0 and δ capture the main effect of shifts in firm boundaries on productivity, β 1 allows scale economies to vary across diversified and undiversified fleets, and β 2 captures the relationship between diversification and asset ownership. We use this more flexible specification rather than simply interacting FLEETOWN and DIVERSIFY to allow changes in productivity to vary with changes in firm size independently of pure composition effects, as one may be concerned that changes in fleet size contain information about changes in productivity. 21 Hypothesis 2 predicts that β 2 < 0: firms that remain vertically integrated following diversification will have lower productivity than dis-integrated firms.
As discussed above, this method will not identify the causal impact of dis-integration on productivity if firms respond to unobserved variables that are correlated with DIVERSIFY when they choose a particular mix of asset ownership. While we report correlations that are consistent with Hypothesis 2, we are unable to distinguish between selection effects driven by firms that benefit the most from a combination of diversification and dis-integration, and true complementarities driven by exogenous variation in the firms' operating environment. A conservative interpretation of β 2 is that it provides an upper bound on the parameter of interest.
Results
Table 3 presents our main results, which show the impact of lateral diversification into the limo market on the expected asset-ownership mix of a taxi fleet. We estimate five different versions of equation (1): OLS, Tobit, firm fixed-effects (the traditional "within" estimator), propensity score weighted regression and the instrumental variables analysis (2SLS). Column (1) contains the baseline OLS results. The average change in the fleet vehicle ownership rate for lateral diversifiers relative to incumbents who did not expand laterally is -27 percent, and this effect is significant at the 1 percent level. 22 This estimate suggests that diversification accounts for roughly half of the large secular shift towards driver-owned cabs shown in Table 1 . In column (2) we estimate a Tobit specification to account for the truncated distribution of FLEETOWN, and find very similar results.
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21 Equation (2) is derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function in Appendix B. We obtain similar results using the more restrictive specification:
The coefficient on DIVERSIFY in the OLS specification is -0.31 so the effect on FLEETOWN is 1-exp{-0.31} = 0. 27. 23 This is not surprising as we observe only 33 censored observations -establishments where FLEETOWN equals either 0 or 1.
Column (3) in Table 3 presents estimates from the traditional within estimator, in part to show that they are not substantially different from our preferred first-differences specification. While the point estimate on DIVERSIFY is 25 percent larger, the difference is not statistically significant. The substantial change between columns (1) and (3) in the coefficient on log(taxi capital) reflects a change in the control variable: the fixed-effects model includes changes in the stock of vehicles, which might be endogenous, while the OLS model includes only the 1992 vehicle stock. 24 In column (4) we report estimates from the propensity score model, which are essentially indistinguishable from those produced by OLS.
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Since the decision to diversify laterally is endogenous, the results shown in columns (1) through (4) (5), we report the 2SLS coefficient on DIVERSIFY of -0.50, which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. We interpret this result as evidence of a causal relationship between diversification and changes in firm asset ownership rates in this industry. While the 2SLS point estimate is larger than the OLS estimate in column (1), they are not statistically different. However, a Hausman test for the exogeneity of DIVER-SIFY rejects the null hypothesis that the OLS results are unbiased. Taken together, the results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1.
In Table 4 , we test our second hypothesis: diversified fleets that remain vertically integrated will be less productive. Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction between DIVERSI-24 It is not especially surprising that changes in firm size are correlated with changes in asset ownership mix, as diversifying firms grew faster than non-diversifiers, due to their smaller initial size and the fact that they attracted many more formerly independent owner-operators. 25 Note that the trimming procedure excludes 55 fleets, or roughly 10 percent of the total sample. These were among the very largest taxi fleets in our data, which generally did not diversify (see Table 2 ). Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-FY and FLEETCARS conditioning on TOTALCARS and all of the main effects. Column (1) in Table 4 presents OLS estimates that are consistent with this prediction. The change in TFPQ for an average diversifier, a fleet that increased driver ownership by 30 percent, compared to a fleet that made no vertical contracting adjustments, corresponds to a 4 percent increase in paid ride-miles per vehicle. Although the magnitude of the effect is relatively small, it is economically meaningful and statistically significant. Columns (2) through (4) show that this result does not change substantially if we trim and weight by the propensity score and/or include a number of additional control variables.
A number of the ancillary parameter estimates in Table 4 deserve some comment. First, the large and statistically significant constant term indicates that the (relative) productivity of fleets in our balanced panel increased between 1992 in 1997. This is not particularly surprising, since the sample conditions on survival over that time period. Second, the negative coefficient on DIVERSIFY suggests a decline in taxisegment productivity following diversification, which is consistent with the anecdotal evidence on ride cannibalization and organizational conflict described in Section 3. Finally, the coefficient on TOTAL-CARS and its interaction with DIVERSIFY have a more subtle interpretation (since TOTALCARS appears in the denominator of FLEETOWN). Our main estimates suggest that fleets with higher TOTALCARS are more productive, and that this effect is less pronounced for diversified fleets.
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Overall, we interpret the estimates in Table 4 as suggestive evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. While we are not able to control for the potential endogeneity of changes in asset ownership, we do find correlations that are consistent with complementarities between diversification and the use of owner-operators.
Moreover, since these complementarities are the mechanism we use to explain the relationship between diversification and dis-integration in the organizational input equation (Hypothesis 1), it is reassuring to find supporting evidence in the corresponding output equation. 26 The main scale effect is found by subtracting the coefficient on FLEETCARS from the coefficient on TOTAL-CARS (which yields a point estimate of 0.37) while impact of diversification on this scale effect is the difference in corresponding interaction terms (which yields -0.15). See the Appendix for a derivation.
Conclusions
This paper examines the vertical implications of horizontal diversification. Our goal is to bring together two large streams of literature on firm boundaries: the (vertical) make or buy literature and the (horizontal) diversification discount literature. We develop a relatively simple story that predicts vertical disintegration -contracting out or agent asset ownership -following horizontal diversification, as a way to mitigate the problems of divisional rent-seeking and organizational conflicts that arise in an integrated firm. We test these predictions using novel data on taxicab firms collected by the Economic Census of Transportation and Warehousing. This industry has several advantages from empirical work; notably the very simple production and contracting environment and the fact that fleets operate in a set of heterogeneous local markets under regulated prices. Our empirical strategy exploits both a regulatory change and variation in local market conditions to show that, diversification into the limo market-segment causes a 20-30 percent shift toward agent ownership of taxis in diversified taxi fleets. We also use a fleet-level productivity measure to show that taxi firms that do not shift towards owner operators following diversification experience less productivity growth than fleets that do adjust their mix of asset ownership.
Taken together these results reinforce the idea that diversification creates managerial challenges that firms subsequently manage through organizational adaptation. This idea is prominent in work by Capron, Dussauge and Mitchell (1998), Capron (1999) and Karim and Mitchell (2000) , and in practitioners' emphasis on the problems of post-merger integration (Uhlaner and West, 2008) . This paper contributes to the dialogue on corporate diversification and organizational adjustment in two ways: first, by emphasizing vertical organization as a specific margin of response; and second, by focusing on a simple empirical setting where it is possible to deal with the likely endogeneity of the decision to diversify.
Finally, by examining diversification and vertical integration strategies as interrelated organizational choices, we shed some new light on how corporate strategies are developed. These insights may be particularly relevant in settings such as the hospitality industry or restaurant franchising, where firms engage in product diversification within a geographic market, frequently through co-investments with agent- The test sample includes firms that meet all of the following criteria: SIC code 4121 (taxicabs) in 1992, {taxi revenue ≥ $10K, at least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county)} in both 1992 and 1997. "All firms" includes firms that meet the sampling criteria in at least one year (1992 or 1997) . Census Bureau restrictions prohibit publication of minimum and maximum variable values. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the instrument is not necessary at the 1% level (χ 2 = 20 in column 5) *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level 
Appendix: Productivity measurement
Our starting point for measuring productivity is a standard Cobb-Douglas production function:
where K is a measure the fleet's capital stock, L are labor inputs and η is a residual that captures all other factors, including the organization of the fleet, that influence productivity. In practice, since taxi fleets use cars and drivers in fixed proportions we do not include a separate measure of labor inputs, so the coefficient on capital may be interpreted directly as a returns-to-scale parameter.
The Economic Census does not report dollar-valued capital for taxi firms, only physical measures of capital. We convert the stock of physical capital to a dollar-valued flow measure using conversion factors from the Taxi Limousine and Paratransit (TLPA) annual Factbooks (1992 and 1997 ) that describe the relative costs of operating fleet-owned versus driver-owned taxicabs.
As is common in the productivity literature, we use revenues to measure output (Y). The fact that revenue contains information about both prices and quantities typically creates an identification problem: if two firms generate different revenues from the same inputs, do we attribute the difference to production technology, market power (i.e. differences in demand), or statistical noise? If the answer is market power, firms are likely to respond to information about demand that is contained in η when they choose inputs.
While addresses this problem using detailed measurements of physical output at the plant level, the taxi industry provides a unique opportunity to recover production function parameters from data on revenues. Since all taxi fleets in the same market face a common price schedule, we include a full set of market-year fixed effects to absorb any between-fleet variation in prices.
Taking the log of (A1) and introducing these fixed effects leads to the following specification:
(A2) log(Y it ) = λ mt + (γ 1 + γ 2 ) log(K it ) + log(η it ),
where the unit of observation is fleet i, operating in market m in year t, and λ mt are a complete set of market-year effects that capture pricing and other market-level productivity shifters.
Total Factor Productivity in Quantities (TFPQ) is the residual in this regression: log(η it ). It is a measure of asset utilization relative to other fleets in the same market that is standardized to have mean zero ec3 e-companion to Authors: Evan Rawley and Timothy S. Simcoe within a given market (county). We specify this residual as a function of diversification and assetownership, and include a term that allows scale effects to differ for specialized versus diversified fleets.
For notational convenience let D=DIVERSIFY, FC=FLEETCARS, TC=TOTALCARS, and FO=FLEETOWN=FC/TC. We can write our specification for TFPQ as follows:
(A3) η = FO {α1 + Dα2} TC { α3 +D α4} exp{Dβ 0 + ε}, where (α, β) are parameters to be estimated, and ε is a statistical error term that we assume is uncorrelated with D, FC, TC, and K. Hypothesis 2 predicts that α 2 <0: vertical integration leads to lower productivity in diversified fleets. Note that log(FO) = log(FC) -log(TC). Therefore, taking the log of (A3) and rearranging terms yields the following expression:
(A4) log(η) = {α 1 + Dα 2 } log(FC) + {(α 3 -α 1 ) + (α 4 -α 2 )D} log(TC) + Dβ 0 + ε.
This expression is equivalent to equation (2) in the paper, with β 1 = α 4 -α 2 and β 2 = α 2 .
In principle, we could substitute (A4) into (A2) and estimate this model in a single step, using pooled data from all fleets-years with revenue as the dependent variable. In practice, we proceed in two steps as is common in the productivity literature . 27 First, we estimate (A2) using data from all fleet-years, and recover estimates of TFPQ = log(η) from the regression residuals. 28 In the second step, we keep only the balanced panel of fleets that survived from 1992 to 1997, and estimate equation (A4) in first differences, using the estimated TFPQ as our dependent variable. Table A1 presents our first stage production function estimates.
TLPA Taxicab/Paratransit Fact Book. 1997. Kensington, Maryland. International Taxicab Association. Standard errors are robust. TFPQ is estimated using all firms with SIC codes 412100 (taxicabs) or 411920 (limousines), taxi revenue ≥ $10K, at least 2 taxicabs, and at least 2 taxi fleets in their market (county) in either 1992 or 1997. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level
